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Three sump concepts: an exhortation to critical social
scientists
John Welsh
Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
ABSTRACT
Do we not find that the repetitive deployment of certain phrases
and words in academic language entails a conceptualisation of
meaning into objects that are thereafter encountered daily not as
thoughts or ideas but merely as a socio-cultural force? Is it not
necessary to identify and illuminate them, and to contrive some
sort of resistance to their potent, though unrecognised,
illocutionary effects? This article concerns the everyday cultural
practices of academic life. It is an attempted intervention into the
mundane language use of academics in order to impact critically
upon the ongoing and constant articulation of certain culturally
latent assumptions into political effects. I argue that within the
social and human sciences ‘sump concepts’ are those extremely
common concepts that recur in analysis and explanation due to
their easy accessibility and to the function that they serve in
reproducing certain discourses of social power. In particular, they
constitute territorialisations of language, linguistic creations that
close off polyvocity, contingency and possibility through identity-
thinking into sutured and reactionary conceptualisations. I present
a selection of three sump concepts that have become thoroughly
imbricated into the discursive culture of academic life – Bottom-
Up, Evolution, and Concrete – and that are complacently resorted
to on a daily basis in social science research and in social
discourse. By exploring their potencies, purposes and pitfalls, I
demand a more cautious and considered deployment of these
concepts in our academic discourses, and advocate for a critical
practice of negative dialectics.
Introduction
In the history of the social and human sciences, Sump Concepts have been those encap-
sulating concepts and elaborating metaphors that get deployed in analysis and expla-
nation, and to which many are drawn for want of a better word.1 They are those
territorialisations of the flow of thought that drag the expression of cogitation back,
with more or less compliance, into the orbit of bromide and unoriginality by the powerful
gravity of that imperative to be communicable. Just as water under the suasions of gravity
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1I should perhaps clarify, for those not in the know, that a Sump is a hollow or pit into which liquid drains. They are com-
monly found on municipal dead ground, in domestic gardens, or within the nether regions of the infernal combustion
engine.




































follows the path of least resistance into the sump, so, given inadequate resistance put up by
the pen and the nervous system, the articulacy of the scholarly mind trickles into the sump
of expression. However, the sump is not a meaningless or entirely random topological
feature, but a functional structure. There are practical contours in discourse formation
that incline the wayward down into the sump, contours that emplace a functional
reason, and it is with this functionality that we must ultimately be very concerned. It is
not that the sump concept is useless, inaccurate or unsophisticated. Accuracy is irrelevant,
sophistication is not the be-all and end-all, and, most importantly, they can in fact be
highly useful. The question is simply of what use they serve. For we ought to be in no
doubt, their effects are as profound as they are ubiquitous.
What follows concerns what one might call the ‘culture of academia’, the practices of
everyday life to be found in its vocational, professional, intellectual and even material
context. Sump concepts might be defended, and are implicitly legitimised, by social scien-
tific discourse, but their effects are the function of cultural practice woven deeply into the
lived experience of academic labour. In particular, it is on the importation and transpor-
tation of certain metaphoric expressions from one discourse to the next without adequate
reflection on this movement that my critique is focused.
Sump concepts are not to be conflated with Grundbegriffen (Basic Concepts), those
concepts of especial historical and social significance in the Western tradition, nor are
they concepts of strategic and popular contestation. Whilst concepts such as Liberty,
State, or Value, are evidently of fundamental importance in the cultural and social
sciences, they are not necessarily sump concepts. That a concept has become the focus
of intense and prolonged intellectual consideration or political contestation, or that it
has generated a strategic discursive framework, does not make of it a sump concept. In
fact, the opposite is more likely the case. Though these elements may be present, it is
the decisively sump-like quality of the concept in its use and deployment that is at issue
here. Meaning, it is the imbrication of a concept with significant social and political
effect into everyday cultural practice in a manner neither apparent nor recognisant on
the part of the practitioner. Admittedly an inelegant descriptive attribute for a concept,
and doubtless compromised by an unscholarly ring, I have selected the term Sump for
its rhetorical potency, rather than academic originality, and because of its allusion to
the re-territorialisation of meaning.
What unfolds below is something of a rehearsal of those critical analysis of concepts to
be found in the canon of critical theory, but the originality here stems not from any the-
orising of a new concept, but from the identification of its operations in discursive prac-
tice. I am then concerned rather with the application of extant theoretical analysis to some
under-considered empirical exempla of concept formation. In fact, it is with the ‘metapho-
ric transportation’ of concepts into social science discourse that I shall chiefly be con-
cerned.2 For those initiated into the poststructuralist discourses of deconstruction from
Nietzsche to Foucault, this kind of conceptualisation is very familiar. However, the orig-
inality for which I aim is not that of theoretical invention, but rather the twofold aim of
identifying particular instances of how certain conceptualisations are imported into the
discourses of critical social science and passively accepted in academic discourse, and
then of indicating the particular consequences of these conceptualisations when imported




































in particular instances. Though this argument is derived from highly articulated theoreti-
cal positions, the agenda here is the exploration of praxis.
What is of practical interest is that sump concepts fabricate epistemic conditions for the
creation of positive and ‘fundamentally interested knowledge’ in particular ways (Foucault
2013: 227), and as they do so they therefore establish the terms upon which we come to
understand the phenomena that we attempt to apprehend through their predications. It is
in this way that they predicate what they purport to investigate, and insinuate into the
social, cultural and historical sciences on which they are deployed a kind of instrumental
rationality. The sump concepts are akin to the ‘cultural lexicon’ of ‘the key words we use to
construct and appraise the social world itself’ (Skinner 2002b: 158). They therefore con-
stitute elements of the apparatuses of control that fashion, maintain and reproduce our
political and social order (Foucault 2007, 2010). As such they are far from harmless;
they are enunciatively strategic. What is then called for, if we wish to engage in strategic
counter-conduct to this kind of concept transportation in discourse formation, is that
we engage in struggle over concept formation, so that they can be ‘turned against the
heavy arms of the State’ as ‘weapon’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2013: 239).
I do not simply want to indulge in a curmudgeonly whinge, nor to preach smarmily, but
to exhort practitioners of the art to consider whether or not their use of sump concepts is
justifiable, or whether in fact they are falling into complacency or reaching the limits of
their lexical recall. I would like my exhortations to be taken neither hubristically nor sen-
tentiously, but as an honest appeal. I ask of the critically minded to what extent their care-
less use of these concepts is compatible with their own explicitly critical agenda and to
what unbeknownst politics they might be contributing in actuality by their repeated use
of them. The aim is to add an ‘extra edge of consciousness’, as Raymond Williams said
of his historical and cultural Keywords (1983: 23–24), but not by an exploration of
‘meaning’ per se. Instead, it is a matter of reflexively turning the microscope onto ourselves
as thinking subjects, academicians and makers of discourse, agitating in favour of a ‘critical
social consciousness’ averse to the consolations of totalising unities (Adorno 1997: 323).
Here we are concerned with practices in political language use, in order to open the
door to a ‘critical ethics of public communication’ that can be taken up by others and
channeled into ‘conditions of practice’ (Corner 2007: 676). The idea of praxis is especially
important here, because the word ‘critical’ implies both demonstrating connections and
correspondences that are hidden and suggesting appropriate interventions. In this
sense, critical thought, speech and action are coordinates.
The objective then is an interrogation of the all-too-easy unities and coordinating ten-
dencies in discursive practices, and the consequent operative rationalities that inhere to
them and operate through them. In this direction, the concepts I shall treat here are as
follows (for those who wish to skip ahead): Bottom-Up, Concrete, and Evolution. These
concepts have been chosen for their evident ubiquity in social science discourses, as
well as the apparent paucity of explicit treatment they have received regarding not their
content, but rather their formation in discourse. Whilst the power relations implicated
in the discursive formation of concepts has been treated from as far back as Nietzsche’s
On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense (1989 [1873]), what remains less easy to find is
consideration of the ‘metaphoric transportation’ entailed in the deployment of concepts
in particular empirical cases. These three concepts, though obliquely and implicitly
covered by the canonical poststructuralist critique of polarities, binaries and geometries



































(Bottom-Up and Concrete), or exhaustively treated as a Basic Concept (Evolution), the par-
ticular circumstances and effects of their ‘metaphoric transportation’ into other discourses
has been little attended to.
How ‘closure’ operates in sump conceptualisation
Before we consider our sump concepts, there should be some words regarding the mech-
anism by which they are fabricated, sutured and propagated. It is probably important to
lay out, at least as implicit backdrop to what follows, the onto-epistemological thinking
behind the formation of the sump concept, as well as to give some indication as to how
they carve out such formidable presence in our collective discursive existence.
The functioning of sump concepts is best positioned somewhere between Frankfurt
Critical Theory and the geophilosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Eschewing
the imperative to synthesise coherently from the respective idioms of Transcendence
and Immanence, I shall simply indicate from where I have drawn my understanding of
how sump concepts operate, why a practical engagement with concept formation and
transportation is so important and what it is that we can do about it. This adumbration
should also help the reader to anchor my subsequent arguments into familiar discourses
of canonical critical theory.
For Deleuze and Guattari, it is the notion of territorialisation that is central. As philos-
ophy is ‘defined as the creation of concepts’ (1994: 41), to think is then to conceptualise. It
is therefore not concepts themselves that are to be avoided, but how those concepts are
brought into being. Concepts are those incorporeal entities of ‘knowing’ the world that
emerge or are drawn out from the ‘plane of immanence’, that indefinable sea of fragments
from which concepts are coalesced and brought into relation with the world (territoriali-
sation). As the concept is defined by components, and is combined out of a multiplicity
that is articulated into a fragmentary whole (1994: 15–16), they are what Deleuze and
Guattari called ‘hecceities’, that is to say, they are heterogenous intensities bereft of
spatio-temporal coordinates (1994: 21). Nevertheless, the concept is a ‘contour, the con-
figuration, the constellation of an event to come’ (1994: 32–33), and so have a figuratively
geographical quality to them. However, at the risk of returning us to the subject–object
distinction, this protean, imaginative and positive thinking regarding concepts does
bear a similarity to the negativity of early Frankfurt theorising on the contours of the
concept as a constellation.
Whilst for Deleuze and Guattari the concept is not discursive (1994: 22), it is from the
early Frankfurt critical theory of Marcuse and Adorno that another articulation of concep-
tualisation can be taken that is discursive, an articulation that anticipated much of the
poststructuralist aversion to unities and simple subject–object and Cartesian binaries,
and one that is more pertinent for a consideration of concepts in the formation of dis-
course. As with the syntagmatics of terms such as 9/11, NATO, or ASBO,3 sump concepts
are examples of ‘closed language’ (Marcuse 2002), and particularly that type of closed
language forged in conceptualisation of phenomenal elements (Adorno 1997). The critical
significance of ‘closed language’ alluded to in the theorising of Marcuse, Adorno, Benja-
min and others, works out from the basic practical assumption that ‘language moulds




































its speakers, which generally prevents speakers from stepping outside their language and
observing that there are … other ways of being in the world’ (Barbe 2007: 509). This
means that, following Nietzsche and Benjamin, ‘the preservation of independent thinking
requires the defiance of society’s language’ (Held 1980: 210). The alternative is that
the elements of autonomy, discovery, demonstration, and critique recede before designation,
assertion, and imitation. Magical, authoritarian and ritual elements permeate speech and
language. Discourse is deprived of the mediations which are the stages of the process of cog-
nition and cognitive evaluation. (Marcuse 2002: 88–89)
This means that the manner in which concepts are not only formed, but also transported
from discourse to discourse without either critical reflexion or re-constitution in the new
discursive context, is highly significant for understanding their potency in shaping dis-
course and coercing cognition by both their form and the manner of their deployment.
Marcuse again,
It is the word that orders and organizes, that induces people to do, to buy, and to accept. It is
transmitted in a style which is a veritable linguistic creation; a syntax in which the structure of
the sentence is abridged and condensed in such a way that no tension, no “space” is left
between the parts of the sentence. (Marcuse 2002: 89–90) [My italics.]
Sump concepts, as one of these remarkable ‘linguistic creations’, therefore have impli-
cations for the operation of instrumental rationalities of power, such as by virtue of the
very impenetrability of their syntax (as in the abbreviations above) or through the
bundled semantic connections that will be entailed in their syntagmatic and spatial struc-
ture. The social force in these linguistic creations therefore makes sump concepts into
‘order-words’, which
… issue commands and arrange bodies in standardized ways. They are our very own deb-
raining machines. These machines don’t whirr; rather, they mumble, with a sort of insistent,
impersonal voice. Order-words are machines of social control that watch over the transform-
ations that bodies undergo as they enter and exit institutional and interpersonal relation-
ships. Order-words restrict becomings but also cannot completely clean out your brain
box, either; they mumble – ‘get in line’ – but add, ‘why bother?’ (Genosko 2002: 41)
This means that in the unthinking repetition of the sump concept, whereby its metaphoric
transportation entails neither reconfiguration of semantic connections, nor reformulation
for deployment in context,
… the meaning is fixed, doctored, loaded. Once it has become an official vocable, constantly
repeated in general usage, ‘sanctioned’ by the intellectuals, it has lost all cognitive value and
serves merely for recognition of an unquestionable fact. (Marcuse 2002: 98)
However, all is not lost. This kind of ‘closure’ in these concepts leads to the internalisation
of dialectical contradictions or of polysemous multiplicities into unitary forms, in this case
words or ‘linguistic creations’, and as such contain the potential for their own negation,
transcendence and practical intervention through critical reflection and contestation.
The reason for this lies in the principal means of the constitution of concepts: identity-
thinking.
It is through identity-thinking that the unity of concepts is constituted, and by which
the openness of a polysemous semantics is curtailed into a closed discursive space that
carries meaning with it, rather than having meanings engineered afresh in the new



































discursive context. Concepts are the nodes around and into which this closure is struc-
tured. Sump concepts operate by means of this kind of identity-thinking. Regarding the
creation of objects of knowing (ie. concepts), when Nietzsche spoke of the ‘arbitrary differ-
entiations’ in separating and connecting one object to another, the ‘one-sided preference,
first for this, then for that property of a thing’, and to the equation of the unequitable in the
creation of concepts (1989: 248), it is to the manoeuvres of identity-thinking that he
referred.
The problem in the ‘metaphoric transportation’ evinced in sump concepts, with which I
shall be concerned below, is that the identity-thinking they entail necessarily misrepresents
objects by subsuming specific phenomena (an infinite variety of aspects of a thing) under
general and abstract classificatory headings within which the phenomenal world is cogni-
tively and conceptually assembled. But while this highly compelling, not to mention
tempting, way of representing reality has the benefit of allowing the manipulation of
the material environment, the ordering of its conceptual content, and the creation of
the ‘principle of equivalence’ (Adorno 1997: 146), the price we pay is an inability to
appreciate the specificity of a particular phenomenal entity, especially in a new context.
Put simply, whilst negative dialectics (as we shall see) seek to say what something is or
can be, identity-thinking says what something comes under, what it exemplifies or rep-
resents, thus what it is not in itself (Adorno 1997: 149). In the final analysis, the irredeem-
ably different and the irreducibly qualitative are indeed reduced and quantified; the
disparate is made into parity, and the unequal are equalised, for the greater glory of
Man-in-Nature. This is how sump concepts ‘fix, doctor and load’ meaning which is
then accepted when its conceptual product is imported into another discourse as inflexible
and invariant ‘closed’ or ‘sutured’ object of concept formation.
In the sump concepts below, the extant lines of identity that are imbued into them are
left intact after their importation, for to challenge, break and re-establish them requires
effort and discomfort, but most of all, it requires recognition that such an undertaking
is even necessary in the first place. The result is unquestioned iteration of identity,
rather than re-composition of new and purposive lines of identity toward our critical
ends. As with Deleuze and Guattari, for Adorno ‘the appearance of identity is inherent
in thought itself, in its pure form’ (1997: 5). We cannot help but ‘identify’ when we per-
ceive and define objects, when we relate objects back to our own subjectivity and to other
objects. Therefore, to think is to identify, with the implication that ‘conceptual order is
content to screen what thinking seeks to comprehend’. This is the complacency entailed
in the adoption and use of sump concepts, whereby the accepted conceptual order substi-
tutes for critical recreation of that order. What can we do about this, and what might I
mean when I call for greater critical vigilance in our use of language?
Speaking briefly in the most abstract sense, concepts do not comprehend their objects
in their totality, there is always a remainder, an under-determination in conceptualisation,
and therefore ‘the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived’ (Adorno 1997: 5). The
epistemic and metaphysical reduction of objects to that aspect of them which is rep-
resented in a given instant, where all that is other than thought is eliminated, and the
subject consumes the object. The result is that the appearance and the truth of thought
comingle, closing off and unifying in the form of concepts. It is the ‘untruth of identity’





































It is perhaps through a Negative Dialectics that a consistent and persistent passion for
nonidentity, and subsequent re-identification (re-territorialisation), can be expressed
(Adorno 1997: 5). In simple terms, we can say that ‘the force that shatters the appearance
of identity is the force of thinking’ (149), but thinking critically outside the terms set by the
conceptual order, with the intention that ‘disenchantment of the concept is the antidote of
philosophy’ (13). Sisyphean as it might be in practice, it is this non-identity thinking
within negative dialectics that I propose be integrated into a critical social consciousness
oriented toward those concepts that embody the sump-like resort to identity-thinking that
are widely apparent in discourse, exploding and liquidating and opening up in the name of
critical political praxis. But what is non-identity-thinking, and what is its principal critical
mode of Negative Dialectics?
It is often objected that dialectical thought ‘leads to closure rather than openness’ and
an indefensible movement toward an elusive ‘completeness’ (Holloway et al. 2009: 4). See-
mingly, detractors of the dialectical mode have had Hegel or Marx primarily in mind here
(Foucault 2010: 42). In contrast, with a critical hypersensitivity toward Hegel’s hypostati-
sation of ontological categories, negative dialectical practice possesses an almost pathologi-
cal reflexivity and restlessness, and to think dialectically here ‘means to think in
contradictions’ and in antinomies (Adorno 1997: 144). It rejects even the possibility of
any ‘unequivocal synthesis’ (Buck-Morss 1977: 63), and resists any attempt at unanimous
interpretation. It would be more accurate on the contrary to say that negative dialectics as
a practice constitutes ‘a critique of the fact that critique itself, contrary to its own tendency,
must remain within the medium of the concept’, a paradox that extends to philosophical
activity as a whole, and that ‘it lies in the definition of negative dialectics that it will not
come to rest in itself, as if it were total’ (Adorno 1997: 406).
What I have in mind here is a loose kind of Sprachkritik, a kind of dialectical exegesis
that draws from a ‘logic of disintegration’ oriented to the conceptual order (Buck-Morss
1977: 64), in this case reproduced in the transportation of closed linguistic creations, and
which seeks to invade the gap between its actualisation and limitation. It is therefore ‘more
critical interpretation than theory’ (67). What Adorno had in mind is to expose ‘the con-
tradictions which riddled [bourgeois society’s] categories and, following their inherent
logic, push them to the point where the categories were made to self-destruct’ (64).
This logic of disintegration is key to the formulation of non-identity thinking as the
core concern and specific device of a negative dialectics that is fundamentally ‘suspicious
of all identity’ (Adorno 1997: 145). This sort of dialectics is more a ‘style of thinking’ than a
method as such (Dowling 1984: 19), which ought to reassure the reader that such elusive
tactics as paradox, contradiction and ‘ruse’ are not merely self-absorbed amusements
(Adorno 1997: 141), but are in fact integral to the critique. What I shall attempt here is
a loose critical activation of negative dialectics, an indication of an agenda, and thus a
modest opening of hostilities against the intellectual fortifications of linguistic, conceptual
and political closure that manifest in the transportation of concepts from one discourse to
another in the social sciences.
So, when I talk about being dialectical regarding sump concepts, what I mean is ‘to
break the compulsion to achieve identity, and to break it by means of the energy stored
up in that compulsion and congealed in its objectifications’ (Adorno 1997: 157). Social
science guns for explanation and prediction, and through these yearnings is driven ener-
getically by the political imperative for social control (Aronowitz 1981: 28). It is to this end



































that sump concepts seduce academics into reproducing the conceptual order by the
uncontroversial easiness of their extant form. Therefore, negative dialectical critique
needs must engage with the energetic compulsion to explain. It is by challenging the coher-
ence, identity and explanatory force immanent to these sump concepts that they can be
broken, a more open and plural position in the discourse promoted, and emancipatory
potentials given at least a chance.
Bottom-up
The metaphoric conceptualisation of Bottom-Up, and its complement, Top-Down, in the
social and cultural sciences ought to be very familiar, as it is everywhere, and as such its
examples hardly need referencing. Is it a relic of our antediluvian rise from four legs on to
two that we have made of the upward motion all that is ‘higher’, loftier, all that is better,
purer, more desirable and less attainable? Is it that, in good old Aristotelian fashion, we are
merely expanding morally on that attitude of our bodies by which we take on food at the
top and expel the feculence down at the bottom? Is this a humanist indulgence of the
slogan ‘man is the measure of all things’ that unfortunately transports us so quickly
into the rapacities of homo faber?4
Of course, ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ in turn produce and are produced by a whole
universe of meanings enshrined in the geometry of our material world and thus are at
hand as the ready-to-go social metonym par excellence. These conceptualisations have
become almost impossible to escape in our compulsive need to explain social phenomena,
and to do so succinctly and popularly. Political geography, international relations and
sociology have been enthralled for eons to spatialised figurations, metaphors and to the
vocabulary of spatial extension in particular: scales, layers, levels, spheres, radii, pyramids
and so on (Agnew 1994, 2005; Brenner 1999). They litter the discourses of social science.
As yet another physical and dimensional metaphor, the Bottom-Up sump concept
permeates a vast range of discourses, academic and political, but it is across the landscape
of all those Realisms in particular that the concept has found its most fertile soil. Let us
consider but one regional terroir. The process-structuralism of the New Institutionalisms,
especially of the Historical variety, has been particularly guilty as regards the Bottom-Up/
Top-Down conceptualisation. An entire breed of such Establishment constructivists in the
social sciences, which has drawn its pedigree from the stables of Harvard Yard, has now
spread its lexical fertiliser across the whole of the social sciences. The legion descendants
today are too numerous to mention, so let us shoot straight for the headwaters.
In her flagship work States and Social Revolutions, Theda Skocpol alludes to a ‘pyramid
of soviets’ constructed through ‘elections from the bottom up’ (1979: 247). This is predi-
cated upon a polarity to which we are inducted earlier in the work.
… no longer from the top-down with emphasis on the state, the dominant class, and the
international context, but now from the bottom up with emphasis on the structural situation
of the peasants in the agrarian economy and in local political and class relations. (Skocpol
1979: 111)
4I am of course aware that my very own conceptualisation of the ‘sump concept’ is contributory to this discourse, and that I




































What are the effects of this conceptualisation? Reading this exemplary passage, are we then
surprised at the devastating marginalisation or vilification of the State in mainstream
social science discourses since the 1980s, when we consider how right here, embedded
in the very conceptual language being used, the State is reified as something neither
abstract, transcendent, phenomenal, nor immanent, but something possessed of a clear
and locatable physicality (somewhere above our heads, apparently)? This, before there
is even any explicit theorising upon it. Regardless of how Skocpol wishes to present the
state, the regurgitation of the concept from the stock of sociological metaphors has a defi-
nite preceding effect.
Charles Tilly’s efforts to elucidate the ‘interplay of top-down and bottom-up power’ in the
sociological history of the capitalist world-system clearly demonstrate a synthetic framework
predicated on an explanatory polarity (1999: 344). The basic coordinates to much of Tilly’s
work predictably juxtaposed the social forces of non-political capital or production emerging
from market exchange as ‘bottom-up’ and political coercion via the State as ‘top-down’
(1999, 1986: 305; 1990: 127–8, 131, 141, 160). It is not hard to foresee the effects of such
an implicit modelling on the perception of the relation between ‘State’ and ‘Civil Society’.
Regardless, when we are informed that ‘in the closer examination of improvised articulation
lies the synthesis between top-down and bottom-up conceptions of power’ (Tilly 1999: 350),
we are also being informed of the decisive place of synthesis in thismode of thinking, amode
not somuch ‘by reference to the ground’ (Foucault 2002a: 53), as by reference from the poles
inwards, but nevertheless still unsatisfactory.
Likewise, in his exploration of social capital, Robert Putnam might describe the ‘top-
down’ versus ‘bottom-up’ debate regarding how we apprehend and present the ‘domains
of social-capital creation’ as a ‘false debate’ (2001: 413). However, the problem is that this
possibly valid criticism contains in it a deeper anti-critical operation that social scientists
rarely acknowledge, as its effects lie outside of the epistemic parameters of procedural
social science. Namely, he does not reject the coordinates (here the ‘national’ and ‘local’
spheres of social organisation, corresponding respectively to top-down and bottom-up).
Rather, he affirms them in his conclusion that only a complex and nuanced synthetic pos-
itionwithin these coordinates is the correct position to take regarding the problem at hand.
He assumes he has deftly collapsed the polarities of the ‘false debate’, but what is crucial is
how he neglects the effect of the syntax implicit in the metaphoric language he imports. In
his references to Skocpol, it seems likely that he has simply appropriated and perpetuated
the conventional resort to this metaphor prevalent in historical institutionalist analysis.
One might question whether it is right or fair to take these excerpts out of context, but
context will not save him here, for it is the raw syntagmatic character of the metaphor
itself that effects the conceptualisation, and for that context is irrelevant. However, even
in terms of the context of his discussion on social organisation, his sympathy for ‘comple-
mentarity’ in relating the national to the local in the organisation of social capital betrays a
reified and unreflexive sociology of categories that assumes too much, problematises too
little, and leads us back to the pitfalls of twentieth century social science.
But this particular sump concept is not confined to the plain of normative social
science. Radical and critical literatures too can harbour the concept. For instance,
taking the discourses critical of the neoliberalisation of academia as an example, we are
told that ‘neoliberalism is best understood as a top-down impositional discourse’
(Larner 2003: 511). The neoliberal university is posited as ‘a corporate model of top-



































down management’ (Thorpe 2014: 221), which thus has ‘to be reinvented on the spot and
from the ground up’ (Zuidhof 2015: 54). From above and from below, even the critical are
bound into the geometric conspiracy to imprison us in its polar dimensions. My objection
here is not with the identification of positionalities of authority and command in the aca-
demic sphere per se, which is arguably a legitimately critical move. My objection is not
predicated on the claim that some other species of dimensional metaphor is more appro-
priate, such as a molecular one (Deleuze-Guattari), a decentred political technology (Fou-
cault), or a generated aesthetic relation (Rancière).5 My point arises from an ‘hermeneutic
of suspicion’ (Ricoeur 2008; Jaeggi 2008) that this particular metaphor has been imported
merely through habit, familiarity and prefabricated availability, rather than the result of
careful selection intended for a specific and conscious purpose in critique. This suspicion
arises from the great prevalence of the metaphor in this literature, which is hardly ever
explicitly and reflexively addressed. It is entirely plausible that such an iterative deploy-
ment of the metaphor reinforces and reproduces a view of academia as a pyramid or
some other top-down geometric form. This is a schema entirely compatible with post-
war social science, Fordist production regimes, corporate hierarchies, bureaucratic
models and thus occludes and deflects critical analysis from thinking about academia
beyond the mainstream institutional(ist) terms. I actually suspect that the need to move
away from this conventional understanding dominant in the literature is imperative at
present, that it constitutes a severe impasse, and that this sump conceptualisation
through metaphor is part of the problem.
When we read such incongruous expressions such as ‘bottom-up governmentality’
(Barnett 2005: 10), it becomes apparent that this particular structural conceptualisation
has even drained into post-structuralist literatures. Needless to say, it seems inappropriate
to insert the notion of a Bottom-Up/Top-Down framework into the social ontology of
Foucault’s biopolitical population, an entity for which any kind of structural dimension-
ality is explicitly incompatible with its stated fluidities and modulations. This is especially
puzzling given the pathological aversion and explicit opposition of Foucault himself to
those modes of thinking by ‘reference to the ground’ that are enunciatively constitutive
of particular power-relational objects in discourse (Foucault 2002a: 53). In this vein, the
constructivist constellation of Bottom-Up/Top-Down enforces a particular quadrillage
of intelligibility in place of a polysemous plane of possibility, and throws us from the
horizon of expectation into the iron maiden of explanatory metaphor. Sadly, we just
end up with a diagrammatic tracing rather than rhizomatic polyvocity (Deleuze and Guat-
tari 2013), which perpetuates a given set of epistemic conditions bereft of critical dynamic,
proper disjunction or any kind of transcendence.
As we noticed above in the Putnam case, in terms of anti-critical force what we have in
this conceptualisation then is biunivocity.6 The usual technique engendered by the
Bottom-Up/Top-Down polar construct in social science researches is the inevitable and
5Whilst some might argue that Top-Down is precisely how power relations and subordinate positionalities are experienced
in academia, this is to assert something of a circularity. Though I do not want to contract the description of others’ experi-
ence, I would ask why the experience of being subjected to authority, domination and command is best described as
coming from above, placing one below. Can such power not also push out to the side (marginalisation), subsume
and overwhelm one (enslavement, conative investment), or indeed aesthetically place on in impossible and paradoxical
positions (the ‘ban’, labour camp).
6Biunivocity designates a type of relation that exclusively links two terms to one another, and where one of the two dom-




































reasonable synthesising of the two fabricated positions. This is not however a critically
defensible manoeuvre. To synthesise within the dualism of given polar coordinates is
not to find a cunning ‘middle road’ or a sophisticated exit from the crudities of biunivocity,
but merely to reinforce the polarity of those coordinates further imprisoning us in the
limits of their epistemic grid (Walker 1993: 32). An ontological framework of Top and
Bottom is then an undialectical dualism, a polarity that reinforces the coordinates of stra-
tification and static positivism, even as its utterers fling their prestigious weight into
attempted social critique and progressiveness.
The fact that ‘Bottom’ is always succeeded by ‘Up’, and ‘Top’ succeeded by ‘Down’,
seals the argument. Not content to rest with the static topological coordinates estab-
lished, the collocated word-bundles contain a necessary and repetitive vectoring, a
motion towards the contrived centre in the discursive totality that ‘closets itself inside
its own terms’ by the generation of the coordinates themselves (Deleuze and Guattari
1983: 77). A prejudicial equilibrating synthesis is fixed in advance. In this way, synthesis
is not encountered as an option, choice or willed conclusion, but as a force one must
accept. This is not a transcendent synthesis in any dialectical or sublative motion, as
there is little or no antithetical freedom, but is the inscription of an illegitimate (restric-
tive and exclusive) ‘disjunctive synthesis’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 110).
The biunivocal structure of Bottom-Up/Top-Down establishes an epistemic con-
dition that comes to function as a doxic ‘plane of obviousness’ that repeatedly short-cir-
cuits the moment of disjunctive synthesis proper and its possibilities for polymorphous
perversities (Holland 1999: 32). It is a sabotaged moment for the realisation of ‘the
domain of free syntheses where everything is possible: endless connections, nonexclusive
disjunctions, nonspecific conjunctions, partial objects and flows’ (Deleuze and Guattari
1983: 54). The biunivocal is then a defining element in the closing off of a non-rep-
resentational domain of free syntheses, a preclusion of ‘unlimited semiosis’ (Holland
1999, 2), a rendering of aleatory and ‘open-ended series containing manifold possibili-
ties for identification’ into an axial tracing of either/or (Holland 1999: 41; Deleuze and
Guattari 1983: 75–76).
Interestingly, in the biunivocal relation of Bottom-Up/Top-Down there is a sneaky
elision over any recognition of the asymmetry in the relation. In the case of
Bottom-Up/Top-Down, there is often an asymmetry where Bottom-Up = Good and
Top-Down = Bad. The structure enforces a symmetry that not only belies the funda-
mental asymmetry of the power-relations to which it purports to report, but that
also frustrates any critical dynamic of transcendence through playing out the
contradictions. Symmetry is stasis. Here lies the reactionary potency of this sump
concept.
In the final analysis, the Bottom-Up/Top-Down concept is at best an unimaginative
prop that substitutes for either more discursive elaboration or lexical precision. It
allows a dubious bracketing in the procedure of thought and communication of that
which ought to be explicitly problematised. But this is done so as to allow the intellec-
tual journeyman to continue on to the one and true matter at hand – explanation and
prediction in the simian service of control and domination over man, woman, beast
and nature. But before returning to the topic of the human ape, let us turn to our
second concept.



































Concrete: hard and soft
This conceptualisation concerns the well-trodden metaphors of Hard and Soft, the
Romulus and Remus of the great empire of empiricist thought in social science.7 Quite
why material reality, and therefore all that is more real, must be ‘hard’ as opposed to
‘soft’ is a curious thing. One can only assume it stems from that same stone kicked by
Dr. Johnson that time. But one development is clear, the metaphorical seepage of the
metaphor into social and cultural science discourses is most certainly real.
As a matter of fact, one often comes across a somewhat Anglophonic paranoia over
non-turgidity in the social sciences generally, a social science that only understands the
real in terms of physical media. We shall return to this momentarily, for now let us just
note that we seem to make of the ‘turgid’ and ‘hard’ all that is more worthy and credible,
as well as prestigious in the hierarchy of academe. These proclivities are replete in social
sciences generally, but even in critical literature we hear in muted tones of association
about hard facts, hard evidence, and even recently about ‘hard reality’ (Lapavitsas 2015:
29), whilst even critical utterers apparently remain oblivious to the potential consequences
of their language use. However, when not exempla of purely sump-like complacency, these
instances are little to do with correspondent truth and everything to do with prestige,
legitimacy and power. I do not want to get sucked into the jostling spats of The Two Cul-
tures problem (Snow 1961), but it is in the question of ‘the hierarchy of the sciences’ (Cole
1983) that the issue of this conceptualisation has been most clearly touched upon before,
and in which it is evidently manifest. It also supplies us with a possible reason for its per-
sistence in an academic social science that has, for the most part, been co-opted into the
mode of ‘police science’ (Rancière 1999, 2015; Foucault 2002b). In this discourse, ‘hard’
natural science is contrasted to ‘soft’ social science (Storer 1967), with a series of graded
pretensions moving outward from sound science and terminating in the moist gossamer
of the Geisteswissenschaften. Naturally, the former are credible and ‘real’, whilst the latter
are not and are not therefore buttressed by any credible epistemological foundations.8
Of course, the hard/soft conceptualisation provides the fundamental motor for an
unacknowledged circular reasoning here. It perpetuates a process that begins with the
metaphysical leap establishing the basis for a positivist-empiricist ontology/epistemology,
whereby real = physical = material = hard. This is never reflexively critiqued, which then
serves as predicate for the assessment of non-positivist-empiricist modes as less real =
less physical = soft. As ‘soft’, they are then less real and so less credible. The modes and
procedures of such incredible thought are then unworthy of consideration as challengers
to the regnant positivist-empiricism, rendering the latter impervious to reflexive criticism.
The circle is complete, and the entire critical canon is cast aside for the airy persiflage and
waste of time that it is.
With the attempt to caste Politics, History, Law, etc., as ‘sciences’ turning out unsuc-
cessful since the deconstructive 1970s, an alternative strategy has emerged. A tremendous
premium has now landed on successful integration of the hard/soft conceptualisation into
7I should just add that this is not a philistine’s invective against concrete. Concrete is possibly the sump concept about
which I feel least bilious and most likely to give people a break. I always liked concrete: growing up in urban Yorkshire,
holidays to the Normandy coast, and a certain antipathy I have acquired to the more tiresome petty-bourgeois sensibil-
ities that so despise its rugged honesty as a building material.




































one’s own disciplinary schema, with academic rewards falling on those who are reproduc-
tive of the ‘hierarchy of the sciences’ through the back door of discursive enunciation.
With the prospect of a proposed axing of funds to political science research in a recent
spending bill for the US National Science Foundation, it was pointed out in the journal
Nature that ‘part of the blame must lie with the practice of labelling the social sciences
as soft, which too readily translates as meaning woolly or soft-headed’ (Editorial 2012).
This need for prestige surely lies behind so much of the taste for ‘hardness’ in social
science vocabulary, though it does not account alone, as we shall see.
It was arguably in the case of Anthropology – that great stepping-stone bridge from the
biological sciences to the social sciences to the humanities – that the first inroads of this
process were made. Clifford Geertz’s (1977) ‘thick description’ of anthropological
phenomena probably comes immediately to mind. Deirdre McCloskey (1988) contrasted
‘thick’ and ‘thin’ methodologies in social science, where ‘thick’ implies a diffuseness and
complexity allied to ‘richness’, and ‘thin’ the intricacy of formal abstraction. However,
such tributaries and side-channels cannot match the omnipresence, effectiveness and
directness of the mainline flow that is the ‘hard/soft’ conceptualisation. Recent years
have therefore seen a sedimentation of ‘Soft Law’ vs. ‘Hard Law’ in jurisprudential
studies (Christians 2007), and the similar rise of ‘Soft Power’ over ‘Hard Power’ has
enthroned a new princeling in the domain of political science (Nye 2004; Campbell and
O’Hanlon 2006). These developments might not be surprising in the cases of International
Relations and Law. After all, as academic disciplines they tend to produce work of great
complexity, but all too often great philistinism also, the academic and social prestige of
which is equalled only by its intellectual and critical limitations. However, the metastasis
of the tendency is spreading in these areas, and the effects are ominous.
Evidently, with ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ we are back once more in the world of biunivocity, but
enough has been said about that already. The leading objection at this point revolves
around three significant effects of the conceptualisation as it is disseminated throughout
the social medium. Firstly, as I have just shown, it prolongs the ascendency of uncritical
positivist-empiricist naiveties, and marginalises critical modes of thought that operate
beyond the pale of sound science.
Secondly, it engenders an uncritical reification of social relations, an absolutely core
concern of critical social science. Surely, as it is principally with social relations that critical
discourses are concerned, those social relations are just as surely ‘objective but immaterial’
(Harvey 2010: 113–14, 128). This apparently oxymoronic formulation is, in fact, to the
point. Social relations that are objective, yet immaterial, are nevertheless just as real as any-
thing tangible, and crucially are possessed of social force regardless of their immediate
immateriality. Aside from the obvious epistemological point here, to challenge the
sump conceptualisation of hard/soft is to question in a single stroke the crude notion
that ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ force, coercion, power, or whatever, denotes or describes effective
differences in the substance of force. This leaves us with the hard/soft conceptualisation
either as a pure sump concept, to which academics resort for lack of expressive talent
or vocabulary beyond their upbringing in vulgar empiricism, or it leaves us with a clinging
to the terminology of academic conformity, acceptance and a steady salary. Either way,
neither of these motivations are satisfactory.
Thirdly, and perhaps most profoundly, it is constitutive of gendered discourse, and so is
contributory to a politics of sexism. Why? Well, of all the arguments presented so far I



































imagine this will perhaps prove the least penetrative of the mainstream, but the answer lies
with ‘turgidity’. The gendered asymmetries of hot–cold, active–passive, dry–moist, turgid–
flaccid, penetrator–penetrated, and hard–soft run through the discourses of the western
tradition right back to Antiquity (Foucault 1986, 1990), with the privileged positionality
of power in the enunciative relation alighting on the first half of each couplet, designating
the masculine over the feminine. These are just some permutations of the ‘two roles and
two poles’ that are perpetually reconstituted asymmetrically through discourse formation
as ‘two positional values: that of the subject and that of the object’ (Foucault 1990: 46), and
through which the reproduction of gendered difference has been inscribed into our his-
torical knowledge-complexes for eons. We might not wish to own up to it, but when
we ontologically privilege the metaphorically ‘hard’ over the metaphorically ‘soft’, we
are engaging in the same unthinking practice and contributing to the oldest of all the
oppressive social architectures.9 It is time we put an end to it.
Evolution
Evolution is one of the most dangerous sump concepts in the social and human sciences, as
the history of the twentieth century can attest, and as the creeping return to bio-techno-
logical eugenics in this century ought to make us beware. Its dangerousness is matched
only by its enormous prevalence in daily speech. Furthermore, it is fundamental to a
whole raft of academic discourses currently fashionable in the social sciences, both
implicitly and explicitly (i.e., evolutionary psychology, developmental economics, social
history, cognitive sciences). What makes it a sump concept, though, ought to be clear.
It is a means of expressing, presenting and talking about historical change without rigor-
ously thinking about it. So often a shorthand simply for ‘change’, the concept is usually
deployed so as to sidestep clear and specific treatment of the knottiest of all historiographic
problems: the relationship of continuity and change, cause and effect, origin and telos,
event and structure and the assignation of significance in narrativisation. The words
and phrases, notions and concepts of evolution entail packaged semantics that accompany
the word unacknowledged, leaving one with the sense that those who import and employ
the term are simply incapable or unwilling to lay out their historicising unassisted by what
is in most instances simply a crutch.
It is, in particular, the widespread and dominant assumption of ontogenetic adapta-
bility, and its complementary phylogenetic narrative, as the defining core feature of the
concept that presents us with the darkest of misunderstandings of its labyrinth, and it
has serious political and social consequences. This is ‘the idea that evolution is a tale of
sequential moulding of parts to designs favoured in local habitats’ (Gould 1987: 48), a
socio-biological position summarised as ‘the equation of current utility with historical
origin’. What is very telling about evolution as a sump concept in the social sciences is
how it is properly a mixed species of Lamarckism, rather than Darwinism proper. It is
on the inheritance of acquired characteristics, influenced and shaped by environmental
change, that the adaptationist assumption is based. Once again, aetia and telos are
returned to our interpretational schema as development and design in History, but this
9Even in recent attempts to advocate in favour of the ‘soft’ (power, law, etc.), there is something typically feline in its




































time through the back door lexica of natural history after careful laundering in the dis-
courses of biological science.
However, for Darwin and others such as Stephen Jay Gould, the concept predicates a
natural history of elimination, rather than positive selection as elevation to worthiness.
‘Natural selection’ for Darwin, as the primary mechanism of evolutionary change, was
at core ‘the preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious variations’
(1968: 131). This preservation/rejection dynamic left a huge range of variation possible in
the extant and the living, neither useful nor injurious, and as such contingent, or as
Darwin put it, as a ‘fluctuating element’ that is ‘polymorphic’. This is the ‘great asymmetry’
of evolutionary history that makes of evolution an entirely negative dynamic (Gould 1987:
49). There is no purpose in an organism’s continuing existence, merely Fortuna. ‘Under
nature, the slightest difference of structure or constitution may well turn the nicely-
balanced scale in the struggle for life, and so be preserved. How fleeting are the wishes
and efforts of man! how short his time!’ (Darwin 1968: 133). However, the term
‘natural selection’ is perhaps unfortunate, as it conveys a misleading sense of agency,
intention, positive preference and thus purposive functionality, in the selection/elimin-
ation traits that just happen to turn out to be ineffective at maintaining life in a given
change of circumstance. When Darwin speaks in the problematic register of agency, we
get as follows: ‘I can see no reason to doubt that natural selection might be most effective
in giving the proper colour to each kind of grouse’ (1968: 134), or; ‘if nature had to make
the beak of a full-grown pigeon very short for the bird’s own advantage… ’ (1968: 137).
Nature is made a counterpart to homo faber. Natura faber?
Of course, in failing to assimilate the negativity and contingency in natural selection, we
are then just a few steps from other dubious notions attendant to the main concept, such as
Design and Development. The place of mutation in evolutionary natural history is interge-
nerational, not an adaptive metamorphosis of the individual biological entity in response
to changing conditions. The characteristics of an entity that prove instrumentally success-
ful by virtue of the fact of its survival alone are epiphenomenal. It is the gravest of misap-
prehensions to see anything as nomological or coherent as a development in the simple
survival, through changing circumstances, of these epiphenomenal traits that are then
memorialised in genetic documentation. That which is presumed to be a linear develop-
ment of stages, those ‘continuous pathways of progress along unbroken lineages’, is
nothing more than ‘a chronological set of termini on unrelated evolutionary trunks’
(Gould 1993: 322).
Design, of course, is the most commonly bandied around term from the manual of evol-
utionary theory: ‘this is what we are designed to do’, one often hears. Funnily, it is the
precise opposite of the meaning and import of the theory of evolution, the exact
epigram of which, if it had one, would read something like: ‘there is no diachronic
design in natural history, merely retrospectively modelled chance and caprice at the syn-
chronic threshold of mutation’. Even the intergenerational transmission of genetic charac-
teristics are not ‘crafted specifically by natural selection for their current function’ (Gould
1987: 49) – it could go either way at any historical moment of transmission – leaving us at
best with ‘co-opted epiphenomena’ that are evidently so disappointing to those addicted to
the comforting and reassuring mode of sociobiological explanation. Tangled in all this is
the repeated gravitation back to a ‘profound unwillingness to abandon a view of life as pre-
dictable progress’ (Gould 1993: 323), and an inability to relinquish all the ‘iconographies of



































evolution’ that reflect ‘our hopes for a universe of intrinsic meaning defined in our own
terms’ (Gould 1991: 43). As Gould clinched it once again, it is an urge with ‘little relation
to truth, and all to do with solace’ (1993: 323).
The implication is that only the most tentative political or moral conclusions can be
drawn from the theory, and these only if qualified almost to the point of irrelevance.
For in the final analysis, this evolution by circumstantial elimination of genetic lines is
characterised by ultimate ontological contingency. The functionality of any evolutionary
trait is purely contingent in historical terms regardless of the teleological privileging of
the Present, toward which most historical interpretation tends as the ‘synthetic activity
of the subject’ in historical interpretation (Foucault 2002a: 15). There is then no more per-
verse and unfaithful a corollary to be drawn from natural selection than to paraphrase its
subtlety with the flatfooted and heavily ideologised term – ‘survival of the fittest’.
Once again, the intention here is not to argue for an exclusive presentation or interpret-
ation of such a thoroughly examined and contested notion such as Evolution, for there are
those that would disagree with the Gouldian way of thinking (Richards 1992). To outline
evolution as a sump concept is rather to demonstrate how a particular interpretation of the
notion is assumed, repeated and made hegemonic over a plurality of discourses unbe-
knownst to the complacent utterer, regardless of their intention in uttering, and to raise
the issue of the political effects of those repeated enunciative interventions.
The transmigration of the quasi-Lamarckian Evolution concept into social non-theoris-
ing, along with all its hellish confederates of Design, Development, and Adaptation, has a
lot to account for. Examples are too legion to cite usefully but just listen to BBC Radio 4
over a given weekend. This conceptualisation, and its related semantics that I have out-
lined, is the oxygen that feeds the kind of Whiggish and teleological History so devastat-
ingly critiqued by the likes of Herbert Butterfield (1965) and Quentin Skinner (2002a), and
which nevertheless saturates the popular feed. Politically, it serves to reinforce the status
quo, for design and development entail necessity, against which naturally enough resist-
ance must be irrational or unnatural. Of course, the oft-fascistic politics of Social Darwin-
ism that is nourished by this sump concept need hardly be addressed; we know the cut of
its cloth already.
More specifically, perhaps the decisive problem with the transportation of the evolution
metaphor lies in its unreflexive privileging of mechanistic causality that usually precludes
more critical epistemologies regarding historical interpretation. The implicit epigenetic
assumption regarding historical change in this meaning of evolution, in contrast to the
ahistoricity of theories of preformation or ‘recapitulation’ in the history of the concept
(Richards 1992), constrains social possibilities by making of historical change a sequential
and linear progression. Here, whatever can possibly be must be spatially and temporally
adjacent to that which recently was and is. In these terms, the organicist, conservative
or grudgingly reformist social politics implicated in this use of metaphor becomes appar-
ent, and so does the reason for rejecting any unconsidered transportation of the concept
into sociological discourses by critical social scientists when speaking simply of change
without intending an explicit theoretical commitment.
What is required therefore, beyond the confines of this essay, is detailed and extensive
investigation into the enunciative function of the evolution concept in contemporary dis-
course outside of biological science, and analyses of the conditions of discourse formation




































could grant me three wishes, it would be that people stop saying that human beings are
‘designed’ for anything, that they utter not that some living entity ‘adapts’ genetically in
a single generation, and that they desist from claiming anything to ‘evolve’ when they
are merely speaking simply of an undefined temporal connection between two phenom-
ena, objects or processes.
Exhortation
The intent of this paper is not to advocate for a complete abandonment of the use of dis-
course-creating metaphor. The point is to make room for the consciously purposive and
original use of metaphor to evoke, provoke, incite, energise, elaborate, critique and texture
in the formation of discourse, by eliminating the unthinking formation of discourse
through concepts that are overfamiliar, trite and regurgitated with neither cognisance
nor artistry. In this I follow Orwell’s assertion that language is ‘an instrument which we
shape for our own [political] purposes’ (1968: 127), particularly regarding the use of meta-
phor. So, couched in the brazen irony and impertinence of my sump conceptualisation,
there is a pertinent point at work and a justification to be found.
However, the discursive prevalence and prominence of the chosen concepts are surely
indisputable. What elevates the significance of these sump concepts above the level of the
annoying is the intellectual and discursive way in which they are constituted as conceptual
creations that suture thought and action into reactionary formations through identity-
thinking. Though only briefly, I have tried to indicate at least the operation of sump con-
ceptualisation. The intention has simply been to introduce the notion and to discuss some
examples cathartically. The next step will be a more elaborate and sophisticated analysis of
the formation of sump concepts, as well as the critical counter-conduct of negative
dialectics.
In the meantime, the basic take-home is a simple one: that we ought to be mindful
of how we use concepts, to introspect rigorously our choice of words, and to engage
with critical vigilance such use by others. It is a reminder to critical social scientists of
the dangers entailed in the passive acceptance of casual conceptualisation in scholarly
language, and of the importance of an active incorporation of concept creation to
one’s own interventions into academic discourse. However, the pull of these
concepts is formidable, and I am sure the desired eradications will not come
anytime soon.
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